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INTRODUCTION 
Gerald D. Lundahl (appellant) appeals from the Orange County 
Superior Court's denial of his motion to vacate the registration of support 
orders from Utah. He argues that the Utah orders are not valid because 
California had already issued support orders and had continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction. He is mistaken. 
The orders issued in Utah were issued long before the enactment of 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) which imports into family 
support law the concept of "continuing exclusive jurisdiction" upon which 
appellant relies. At the time the Utah orders were issued, there was no such 
thing as "continuing exclusive jurisdiction." The enactment of UIFSA cannot 
retroactively invalidate orders which were valid at the time they were entered. 
1 
Thus, the California orders and the Utah orders are all equally valid and 
enforceable. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE17 
Appellant obtained a divorce from Ruth Marlene Lundahl Telford 
(Ruth)-7 in Los Angeles County, California that resulted in a Judgment 
determining property and support filed on September 14,1977. (AA Vol. I, p. 
1.) Child support was set at $1,600 per month and spousal support at $600, 
beginning July 15, 1977. (AA. Vol. I, p. 4.) 
Appellant filed an action in Utah to enforce his visitation rights, 
submitting to personal jurisdiction of the Utah courts. (AA Vol. I, p. 34.) 
Appellant and Ruth participated in various hearings in California and 
Utah which resulted in numerous orders for arrears and modifications of 
support in each state as herein described.-7 
1. The record on appeal consists of a two volume Appellant's 
Appendix. (AA Vol. I, pp. 1-217, and AA Vol. II, pp. 218-424.) This court 
has also granted appellant's motion to take judicial notice of the opinion from 
a previous appeal in this case, GO 19679. (GO 19679, pp. 1-5.) Respondent has 
concurrently filed a motion to augment the record to include a copy of one of 
the California orders. (Mot. to Aug. Exh. A.) 
2. Appellant has two former spouses, both named Ruth. Some 
documents from his second dissolution are included in this record, for example 
the Stipulation and Order found at AA Vol. I, page 175. Ruth C. (Carlson) 
Lundahl is not the respondent in this case. Orange County Superior Court case 
number D315562 is not the dissolution of the parties in this action. Ruth 
Marlene Lundahl Telford, a respondent in this appeal, has not signed any 
stipulation compromising the support arrears owed to her under the California 
orders or under the Utah orders. 
3. It is not known whether these are the only support orders in each 
state. The California orders are the only ones to which appellant refers and the 
Utah orders are the ones that were the subject of the registration and 
enforcement efforts in Orange County. 
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Sometime after the dissolution judgment in Los Angeles was filed, the 
action was transferred to Orange County. The following orders made in the 
dissolution action are part of the present record: 
1. Child support was modified on August 24, 1987, to $1,800 per 
month beginning March 1987 for four children until emancipation of the eldest, 
then $ 1,500 for three children until the next eldest emancipated, then $ 1,200 per 
month for two children until the next eldest emancipated, then $600 per month 
for the youngest child until emancipation. (AA Vol. I, p. 122.) Spousal support 
was modified to $1,000 per month until the eldest child emancipated, then 
$1,050 until the youngest child emancipated, then to $1,250 until death of either 
party, remarriage of Ruth, or further order of the court. (AA Vol. I, p. 123.) 
2. On March 3,1989, appellant and Ruth were awarded joint legal 
custody of Kassi with physical custody awarded to appellant. (AA Vol. I, pp. 
127 & 129.) Support was not addressed. {Ibid.) 
3. On May 5,1993, appellant and Ruth were awarded joint custody 
ofKwinci with physical custody to appellant. (AAVol. I, p. 128, 131.)17 Child 
support was terminated. 
4. On November 16,1994, with no appearance by Ruth and based 
on an offer of proof by appellant's attorney, spousal support was modified to 
$500 per month beginning July 1994. (Mot. to Aug. Exh. A.) 
5. On January 24, 1995, the Riverside County Family Support 
Division-7 filed a stipulation in the Riverside County Superior Court (case 
4. Appellant's appendix is slightly out of order. The March 3, 1989, 
order is on pages 127 and 129. The May 5, 1993, order is on pages 128 and 
131. 
5. Riverside County was enforcing for a period of time because 
appellant resided or had property in Riverside County. The case was later 
transferred to Orange County. The exact dates of this change are not part of 
this record. 
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number D120812) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350.6, 
agreeing with appellant his arrears for the period from August 1,1991 through 
December 31, 1994 were $31,498.18 and that appellant would pay $1,852.83 
per month toward these arrears. (AA Vol. I, p. 152.) This agreement purported 
to include spousal support which had accrued under the Orange County order 
dated October 31, 1994, for the period from June 1, 1993 through December 
31, 1994. (AA Vol. I, p. 155.)- Notably, this stipulation was not signed by 
Ruth. (AA Vol. I, pp. 155.)-
On October 30, 2001, the Orange County Department of Child 
Support Services (Department) registered the Utah orders in the Orange County 
Superior Court, case number 01FL007984. (AA Vol. I, p. 15.) The following 
Utah orders were attached to the registration: 
1. Order on Order to Show Cause filed April 24, 1991, setting 
temporary support of $3,000 per month for family support. (AA Vol. I, pp. 28-
30.) 
2. Order and Judgment filed August 29, 1991, setting arrears of 
$3,500. (AA Vol. I, pp. 26-27.) 
3. Judgment filed March 11,1993, establishing arrears of $29,200 
through February 1993. (AA Vol. I, pp. 24-25.) 
6. There was no order issued on October 31, 1994. According to the 
Family Law Docket Report for the Superior Court, the Order to Show Cause 
was filed on that date. An order on a previous OSC was filed on November 16, 
1994, and was not included in Appellant's Appendix. (AA Vol. II, p. 414.) 
7. This stipulation would not effect the arrears owed to Ruth because a 
County child support agency may not stipulate away the custodial parent's right 
to support arrears. {Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684,696.) 
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4. Findings of Fact, Order Modifying Decree and Judgment filed 
April 13, 1995, setting support of $2,235.00 per month and arrears of 
$62,100.00, plus attorneys fees of $5,200.00. (AA Vol. I, pp. 20-23.) 
5. Order and Judgment filed February 28,1999, establishing arrears 
of $62,991.72, plus interest. (AA Vol. I, pp. 18-19.) 
Thereafter, appellant challenged the registration of the Utah orders on 
the following grounds: 
1. The court did not have personal jurisdiction over appellant, 
2. The support order was vacated, suspended, or modified by a later 
order, 
3. The amount of arrears was incorrect, 
4. Some or all of the arrears were not enforceable, and 
5. Enforcement was barred by the doctrine of laches. (AA Vol. I, 
p. 32.) 
The hearing on appellant's motion to vacate the registration was held 
on May 3,2002. (AA Vol. II, p. 393; RT 1-45.) The Court denied the motion. 
(AA Vol. II, p. 393.) 
The Amended Findings and Order After Hearing filed on September 
27, 2002, stated that appellant's motion was denied because he failed to carry 
his burden of proof as to the objections he raised. (AA Vol. II, p. 421.) All of 
the Utah orders were deemed registered in California leaving establishment of 
arrears as the only issue. (Ibid.) The court also specifically found that the Utah 
court had personal jurisdiction at the time the Utah orders were made and that 
California and Utah had concurrent jurisdiction to enter orders. (Ibid.) 
Appellant submitted insufficient proof that the Utah orders were vacated, 
suspended or modified by later orders. (Ibid.) The court found no 
unreasonable delay and insufficient showing of prejudice as applying to 
5 
appellant's defense of laches. (Ibid.) Appellant's counsel approved the 
amended order as to form and content. (Ibid.) 
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on July 2,2002. (AA Vol. II, pp. 
396-397.) 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE UTAH ORDERS WERE ISSUED BEFORE 
ENACTMENT OF UIFSA AND ARE VALID, 
ENFORCEABLE ORDERS. 
Appellant relies on the principle of "continuing exclusive jurisdiction" 
codified in UIFSA, citing California Family Code, section 4909, subdivision 
(f). This section provides: 
A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent 
with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the 
existence of the support obligation. A tribunal of this state 
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal 
of another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
over that order under the law of that state. 
(Fam. Code, § 4909, subd. (f).) 
UIFSA was enacted in California effective January 1,1998, long after 
the Utah support orders were issued. Appellant contends UIFSA is retroactive 
and thus the Utah orders are void. Appellant is mistaken. 
All prior valid orders remain valid under UIFSA. Where there are 
multiple orders for support, "[a]mounts collected and credited for a particular 
period pursuant to a support order issued by a tribunal of another state shall be 
credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under a 
support order issued by the tribunal of this state." (Fam. Code, § 4913.) Like 
all states, Utah has enacted UIFSA verbatim, in Utah Code 1953, section 
78-45f-209, which was enacted in 1996. 
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At the time the Utah orders were issued, The Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) provided that an order 
made by a state with personal jurisdiction would not nullify and would not be 
nullified by an order issued by another state.-7 (Former Code of Civ. Proa, 
§ 1689, repealed by Stats. 1992, ch. 162 (A.B. 2650), § 6, operative Jan. 1, 
1994, reenacted at Fam. Code, § 4840, et seq., repealed by Stats. 1997, ch. 194 
(S.B. 568), §1.) Appellant submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the Utah 
courts by filing an action in that state to enforce the California dissolution. 
Under RURESA, an order made in another state did not supercede 
previous orders in other states and did not modify the other state's orders unless 
the formal order specifically so stated. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1689, repealed by 
Stats. 1992, c. 162 (A.B.2650), § 6, operative Jan. 1, 1994, [modification of 
other state's order] reenacted at Fam. Code, § 4840, which was repealed by 
Stats.1997, c. 194 (S.B.568), § 1; see In re Marriage of Ward (1994) 29 
Cal.App.4th 1452, 1456-1457.) 
[Wjhere no specific plea for modification has been raised, 
the plain meaning of former Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1689 is that a reciprocal support order, in and of 
itself, will not act to supersede a prior support order arising 
from a dissolution action. Supersession occurs only where 
the issue of modification has been raised and litigated by the 
8. RURESA was a revision of the earlier Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). {In re Marriage ofLurie (1995) 33 
Cal.App.4th 658, 662, fh. 2.) Neither act contains any concept of "continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction." When California established the "Family Code" in 
1994, RURESA was reenacted without substantial change and again called 
URESA. {Ibid) Many practitioners and courts did not change the acronym 
after enactment of RURESA, resulting in interchangeable use of URESA and 
RURESA. An example is found in State of Utah v. Jacoby (1999) 975 P. 2d 
939, cited by appellant and discussed post. The opinion states that UIFSA and 
URESA were both in effect in Utah in 1997. (Id. at p. 941.) In fact, RURESA 
was enacted in Utah in 1980. (Utah Code 1953 § 77-31-1, enacted by L. 1980, 
ch.l5,§2.) 
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parties. Likewise, a reciprocal support order . . . which 
differs in face amount from a prior dissolution action 
support order but does not expressly mention modification, 
cannot automatically and after-the-fact, modify the 
dissolution order; the amount on the face of the reciprocal 
order merely represents the sum currently enforceable. 
In re Marriage ofPopenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 521.) 
Although the enactment of UIFSA should prevent multiple orders for 
the same parties in the future (Fam. Code, § 4909, subd. (f)), it is clear that 
UIFSA specifically contemplated the situation found in this case. There is no 
provision in UIFSA which would act to retroactively nullify valid order issued 
prior to its enactment. To the contrary, UIFSA expressly provides that prior 
valid orders of other states remain valid and further describes the appropriate 
method to credit collections. (Fam. Code, § 4913.) 
Appellant's argument with regard to Department of Human Services, 
ex rel v. Jacoby (1999) 975 P.2d 939 is misplaced. First, in Jacoby, the action 
was filed in Utah in 1997, at which time both UIFSA and URESA were in 
effect in Utah. {Id. at p. 941.) After the state filed the motion to set child 
support arrears, and after URESA was repealed, Jacoby requested a 
modification of his child support and spousal support. (Ibid) The request for 
modification was thus governed by UIFSA. Jacoby did not interpret the 
validity of multiple orders, it determined that a request for modification filed 
after enactment of UIFSA is governed by UIFSA. {Id. at p. 942.) "UIFSA 
merely provides a framework for enforcing one state's support order in another 
jurisdiction." {Ibid) The court specifically stated that the result in Utah would 
"not limit or reduce the amount due and for which Jacoby [was] ultimately 
liable." {Ibid.) In other words, all three judgments - from Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Utah - were valid extant judgments entitled to enforcement, at 
least in the issuing state. The court went on to find that, under UIFSA, a 
spousal support order may only be modified by the issuing state. {Id. at p. 945; 
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UT Code Ann. § 78-45f-206(2), Fam. Code, § 4909, subd. (f).) Since the court 
in Jacoby had already determined that UIFSA applied because the action for 
modification was filed after enactment of UIFSA in Utah, and Virginia was the 
issuing state for the spousal support order, Utah did not have jurisdiction to 
modify the spousal support. (Ibid,) 
Further, the Jacoby court held that the choice of law provision in 
UIFSA was a procedural change and therefore could be applied retroactively. 
(Jacoby, at p. 942.) Jacoby's argument was that a defense of statute of 
limitations was a vested right, and UIFSA could not apply. UIFSA provides 
that when there are multiple orders, the longer statute of limitations applies. 
(Fam. Code, § 4953, subd. (b).) In discussing retroactive application of UIFSA, 
the court in Jacoby consistently refers to the concept that no "substantive 
rights" are affected. (Jacoby, supra, 975 P.2d at p. 943.) Application of 
UIFSA in that case did not act to invalidate any of the multiple orders. It was 
a simple choice of law decision. There is no provision in UIFSA which would 
act to retroactively nullify valid orders issued prior to its enactment. 
II. 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT IN THE PREVIOUS 
APPEAL, CASE NUMBER G019679, DOES NOT 
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT 
CALIFORNIA HAS CONTINUING EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION. 
In 1995, Ruth filed a motion to set aside the November 1994 
California order. When her motion was denied, she appealed and this court 
affirmed the trial court's decision. (Case no. GO 19679.) In the present action, 
appellant's motion for judicial notice of the opinion in the previous appeal was 
granted. However, nothing in the opinion supports appellant's argument that 
this court has already found California to have continuing exclusive jurisdiction 
in this case. 
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The opinion recited the litany of litigation, concluding the recitation 
of the facts by stating: "Possessing two support orders [the 1995 Utah order 
and the 1994 California order], Ruth returned to California to set aside the 
November 16,1994 award." (G019679, p. 3.) The validity of the Utah order 
was never in question. Ruth claimed extrinsic fraud and/or extrinsic mistake in 
the California action and that she was, therefore, denied a fair adversary 
hearing. (GO 19679, p. 3.) This court held that the judgment must be affirmed 
because the transcript Ruth introduced on appeal was not available to the trial 
court and did not, in fact, support the facts she asserted regarding her claimed 
lack of personal jurisdiction because she made only a special appearance. 
(GO 19679, p. 5.) Moreover, this court held that even if it chose to assume her 
version was correct, California, "pursuant to the dissolution judgment, 
maintained jurisdiction over the parties and spousal support." (GO 19679, p. 4-
5.) The opinion does not use the term "exclusive." This court further noted 
that a more appropriate remedy to challenge jurisdiction is a motion to quash 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 and Ruth's failure to file such a 
motion, coupled with her set aside motions, prevented her attack on the 1994 
order. (G029679, p. 5.) In a footnote, this court repeated Ruth's counsel's 
statement that "we have jurisdiction all over the place" and that California and 
Utah, in his opinion, had "concurrent jurisdiction." (GO 19679, p. 4, fh 1.) This 
court did not question these statements. 
Jurisdiction was not the issue in that appeal, particularly the 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts to have entered the previous orders. The only 
issue decided was whether Ruth had been denied her fair hearing. This court 
held that she had failed to provide sufficient evidence to the trial court and, 
even if she had been denied a fair hearing, she had not followed appropriate 
procedure to challenge the resulting order. (GO 19679, p. 5.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant is mistaken in his reliance on the concept of "continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction" because this concept did not exist when the orders were 
issued. At that time, the California and Utah had concurrent subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Utah orders are valid, enforceable orders. The only issue, as 
the trial court stated, is the amount, if any, of arrears that may have accrued 
under those orders. The Department requests this order be affirmed. 
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Notice of Appeal 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 
DIVISION THREE 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, 
v. 
RUTH M. TELFORD, 
Appellant, 
Respondent; 
ORANGE COUNTY FAMILY 
SUPPORT DIVISION, 
Intervener and Respondent 
G030846 
(Super. Ct. No. D272323) 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves the validity of several spousal support orders issued by tribunals in 
California and Utah. This Court has asked for comments on the question: 
Does the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act [UIFSA] establish a mechanism 
for settling upon a single order as controlling among multiple spousal support 
orders? 
In response, amicus curiae would assert: 
While UIFSA does not have formal rules for determining which tribunal's order 
controls the issue of prospective spousal support, it does have a mechanism for 
determining the tribunal that issued the order that controls the accrual of spousal 
support. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
UIFSA clearly is applicable to both child support and spousal support. (Fam. Code, § 
4901 (r) and (u)). However, it was not drafted nor in effect in either Utah or California at the 
time of the entry of the orders germane to this matter. 
As the successor to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [URESA] and 
the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [RURESA], UIFSA recognized the 
prior Acts and practices had created situations where the same family members were under the 
jurisdiction of multiple tribunals and subject to multiple support orders. 
The major change made by UIFSA was the introduction into interstate family support law 
of the concept of one tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction to set and modify family support. (Fam. 
Code § 4909) To move from the URESA and RURESA multiple order environment to the 
situation where there is only one tribunal with jurisdiction, Fam. Code § 4911 sets out a 
procedures for determining which one order among multiple existing valid child support orders 
will "control" the issue of prospective support. The order determined to be prospectively 
controlling establishes the one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order. 
Determination of the controlling order and tribunal with prospective exclusive jurisdiction does 
not affect the accrual of support other than to fix a date after which the accrual will be based only 
on the one, controlling order. 
By it's express terms, Fam. Code § 4911 does not apply to multiple spousal support 
orders. However, UIFSA does provide a mechanism for determining what spousal support order 
will govern the accrual of spousal support. To make a proper determination of what support order 
governs the prospective accrual of spousal support requires several steps of analysis. 
1. Are all of the spousal support orders valid? 
The fundamental issue is whether the California and Utah courts had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the spousal support issue and personal jurisdiction over the parties at the time of 
entry of their orders. No issue has been raised regarding the validity of the California orders. 
Utah law confers subject matter jurisdiction over alimony to Utah courts. If there was any issue 
of personal jurisdiction over the obligor at the time of the January 1991 Order on Order to Show 
Cause, it should be mooted by the failure to raise it at the subsequent personal appearance in 
August 1991. 
2 
An attack on the validity of the Utah order, premised on there being a California court of 
"continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" in existence at the time of the 1991 Utah order, is 
unavailable. As discussed in Respondent's Brief, the concept of one tribunal with continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction in an interstate family law case was not operative until several years after 
the Utah order. 
The concept in effect at the time of the Utah spousal support order was that a tribunal 
could ignore giving an existing support order full faith and credit with regards to prospective 
support.1 A tribunal with subject matter and personal jurisdiction could impose an additional 
support obligation so long as it found a duty of support imposable under it's family law. Like 
many other states, the Utah version of RURESA provided for a definition inclusive of spousal 
support: 
"Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or 
by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether 
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or 
otherwise. Utah Code 1953, 77-31-2(6) [repealed by enactment of UIFSA, 1996] 
Thus, the inquiry regarding the validity of the Utah order focuses on whether the general 
family support law of Utah in 1991 allowed a Utah tribunal to impose a duty of spousal support 
in addition to one already imposed by California at the time of the California divorce. It should 
be noted that the Utah action was not in connection with a Utah divorce; the parties had been 
divorced by a California order for many years. If Utah law did not allow the establishment of a 
second spousal support order in the context of the action filed and resolved by the April 24, 
1991, order then the Utah orders might have been voidable for exceeding the statutory power of 
the tribunal had the decisions be properly appealed. Unless Utah law provides an appropriate 
remedy as this late date, the original order and subsequent modification remain in full force and 
effect. No collateral attack should be allowed. 
2. What is the effect of a subsequent spousal support order? 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Utah orders are valid, the next step in the analysis is to 
1
 This basis for this principle often is unarticulated. It origins appear to be the 
interpretation in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 14; 30 S. Ct. 682, 685 (1910) of Lynde v. Lynde, 
181 U.S. 183,21 S.Ct. 555(1901). 
3 
determine the effect of the Utah orders. One of the major misstatements regarding subsequent 
orders entered pursuant to RURESA is that the latter order "modified" the former. An ability for 
one state to modify another state's existing, valid order was permitted under some state's 
versions of RURESA; however, it's use was very circumscribed. Utah law did not support even 
the limited ability to modify. See Oglesby v. Oglesby, 510 P.2d 1106, 1107 (1973). Thus, entry 
of the Utah order created two, valid, spousal support orders. Being valid orders, both are entitled 
to full faith and credit with respect to any missed payments. 
Another important consequence of the establishment of two simultaneous orders by two 
tribunals in two states is that neither has the authority to "modify" or nullify the orders of the 
other. Utah and California now operate under UIFSA. UIFSA has no mechanism for transfer or 
consolidation of spousal support jurisdiction. 
3. What is the highest order in existence at any given time? 
This is the issue that resolves what order controls the accrual of prospective support. 
Long before URESA, RURESA, or UIFSA, the principle was established that a missed payment 
on a valid judgment is an obligation entitled to full faith and credit. See Footnote 1. Both 
RURESA and UIFSA provide for simultaneous accrual and simultaneous credit for payments 
made on any order. Simply stated, an obligor owes the highest amount, not an aggregate amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The benefit of Fam. Code § 4911 is that it allows for a determination of which order will 
govern prospective child support without regard to the amount of the order. UIFSA bases the 
determination of what tribunal will have the ability to set and modify child support on which is 
best suited to obtain information regarding the best interest of the child or an obligor's ability to 
pay. 
There is no similar consideration for pre-existing spousal support obligations. Each valid 
obligation continues until terminated by order of the tribunal that issued it. Each tribunal having 
issued a valid spousal support order has the ability to increase it above the prevailing amount of 
another valid order. While none of the tribunals are able to have exclusive jurisdiction to control 
the prospective spousal support amount, the tribunal that issues the highest order is in de facto 
control. 
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